ADDRESS OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMY AT AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, DECEMBER 11, 1959
Sli~htly less than 200 years ago there existed on the American continent
13 separate and sovereign countries.

r.rhese countries differed substantially

in customs) religion, and economic institutions .

Except for one factor, the

United States of America today might well be the States of America, still
existing in wholly individual sovereignty.

The factor which played the most

important part in the unification of the States under a federal republican
system of government was the need for a common defense.
Just as the necessity for the strongest defense was a primary consideration
in the thoughts of our forefathers, it has remained and is today one of the
basic concerns of the people of the 50 United States of America.
The United States of America is a young country.

In the records of the

thousands of years through which the civilization of man has progressed, our
Nation has found a place in history for a period of less than 200 years.

From

a standpoint of rate of progress, however, we stand second to no nation in all
of history.

Unlike many of the early world powers ; we have reached the cross

roads of destiny in a short time, and find ourselves now confronted with a
position of world leadership and, as such, responsible to a degree unknown to
any other nation for the survival of mankind.
The Second World War was the culmination of our rise to the top as a world
power and required our acceptance of the role of world leadership which we had
previously been reluctant to undertake.

While we are inclined to pride our

selves on the glory of our position as the leader of free peoples , our acceptance
of our responsibility as principal defender of liberty for the world since World
War II fails to demonstrate an unexcelled ability on our part to exercise this
responsibility in the field of defense.
In 1945 and

1

46, we followed our unbroken historical post-war practice of

rapid demobilization of our Armed Forces.

Thus we began our out-in-the-open

struggle with the forces of Communism from a position of weakness.

By 1947) we

were beg;tnning to realize the error of our ways , and a rather slow; almost half
hearted, build-up of conventional forces was cormnenced.

The creation of the

Department of Defense and the reorganization of the Armed Forces were the most
notable advances of this rebuilding effort.
In 1948, communist capabilities had been underrated to the extent that we
reversed our course and again began over-economizing our defense.

These

defense cut-backs continued until we were rudely shocked into an almost
awakened state by the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950.
we became initiated into the concept of'limited war".
- 1 -

It was here that

Even during this period

of armed conflict, we limited our efforts largely to those required by that con
flict itself.
Only after the end of the Korean War did we seriously concern ourselves
with what we then thought of as weapons of the future- -missiles.
We approached the development of missiles with a measured pace , comfortable
in the imagined safety of our superiority in nuclear devices and the potency of
our Strategic Air Command Forces.

It was not until the fall of

1957 that we

came face to face with the hard facts of life--that Russian Communists were a
foe worthy of our best efforts.

It took Sputnik to bring us to a realization

of our peril, if indeed we have yet truly faced that reality.
our errors in the decade following World War II are easy to detect from
the vantage point of hindsight.

In view of the history of the American people >

our commission of errors should not be surprising to us .

We are truly a

peace-loving peoples, most reluctant to concern ourselves with war until we
are backed to the wall.

Our strength, and even our survival, has traditionally

resided in our ability to unify and concentrate our efforts in extreme emergency .
We must first face reality with respect to our national defense responsi
bility.

First > the large defense effort which is essential to our survival

will not decrease in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, it is quite probable that

an even more expensive undertaking lies ahead of us.

The cost of liberty has

never been cheap, and we shall be indeed fortunate if in the years ahead we
can preserve it with a diversion of our resources rather than additional
sacrifice of lives.

Now is the time for a resolve by all people of our country

to sacrifice whatever is necessary of our material wealt h choor:f'ully and willingly
in order to preserve the infinitely greater wealth of f r eedom.
At every mention of def ense we , as Americans , in this day of rapid
developments in technology are particularly inclined to think in terms of
hardware and numbers of uniformed men.

Unquestionably_ both trained men in

sufficient numbers and the best equipment possible are essential to any
adequate defense effort .

We should ever keep in mind that the basic strength

of any people, regardless of the size of their armed forces or the modernization
of its equipment, lies in the moral fiber of its citizens.

A demoralized

people, whatever their outward vestiges of defense , can never know the joys
of success or the fruits of victory.

The most basic and essential ingredient of

a successful national defense must lie in the will and determination of the
people themselves to protect their liberty regardless of the sacrifice.

This

will and determination to fight when necessary can only be stimulated by a
deep and abiding love of l i berty and a realization of the constant threats to
its existence.
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Since this basic ingredient of our national defense--the will to fight-
must stem from the people, it is the people themselves who bear the responsibi
lity as well as the cost of our national defense effort.

It is, therefore, the

right--and even more, the duty--of the .American people to insist on two things:
first, that our defense is secure; and second, that our defense dollars are
being spent wisely.
Our task will not be an easy one .

Lest anyone still be deceived concerning

the challenge which faces us, consider the assets of our potential antagonist .
He has:
First, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and chemical and biological
weapons , and means to deliver these to targets almost any place on the
globe ;
Second, a gigantic ground force equipped with highly modern weapons;
Third, control over a riDg of satellite countries responsive to his
will;
Fourth , a highly developed apparatus for conducting subversive
activities in countries which he does not dominate ; and
Fifth, an appealing ideology which, however false and hollow it is
has an attraction for many of the underprivileged people of the world.
Our present defense policy is framed around the maintenance of a deterrent
force with sufficient capability to make it obviously unwise for any aggressor
nation to chance its unleashing.

Today, and possibly for some time yet to come ,

insofar as an all-out nuclear war is concerned, we have such a deterrent force.
It is comprised principally of the Strategic Air Force and its long-range
nuclear capabilities.

Supplementing the Strategic Air Force are intermediate

range ballistic missiles ringing our potential enemy at widely dispersed sites ,
and carrier-based aircraft with nuclear capabilities.

There can be little

question that the Atlas inter-continental ballistic missile will soon be
available in sufficient operational numbers to complement and eventually replace ,
with its successor ICBM's , the Strategic Air Command.
As

long as our potential enemies must rely principally on ICBM's for

offensive efforts , our retaliatory capabilities should be sufficient as a
deterrent force to prevent all-out war.
Grave danger now lies in our self-satisfaction at the fact that our
present retaliatory forces are a sufficient deterrent , despite our failure to
decrease the Soviet's scientific lead demonstrated by Sputnik, and reproven by
the recent Russian Lunar probe.

I fear we are once again in danger of planning

our retaliatory defense forces around weapons of today.

The inter-continental

ballistic missile, with its nuclear war-head, is no more an ultimate weapon
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than was the Maginot Line or the Atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

There has never

been an ultimate weapon , nor is there a..11y sound reason to believe there ever
will be one.
Let us be more specific.

If one nation now develops a space platform

relatively impregnable to attack by its enemies' present state of weapon
development, the stalemate is broken.

attack could not be stopped by any

An

amount of retaliation on the aggressor's homeland.

This is where the lead in

scientific development, now obviously enjoyed by the Soviet Union in the field
of thrust and rocketry, must be overcome .
presently sufficient retaliatory force.

It is no answer to rely on our
A bare minimum may suffice for the

present, but at some future state , it will prove woefully inadequate.
This brings us to another matter of vital concern, and that is the
emphasis that is distributed between basic research, on the one hand, and applied
research or technology, on the other.

History will undoubtedly record the

efforts of the people of the United States during the first 200 years of our
history as unexcelled in the field of technology.

I speak of technology in

this context as developmental or goal-oriented research, as contrasted to basic
or fundamental research, which is the accumulation of knowledge for the sake of
knowledge , or the satisfaction of curiosity.

In the latter field we are in

danger of being judged by historians as woefully inadequate .
The development of the Atom bomb amply illustrates our superiority in
technology and our weakness in fundamental research.

The great stream of

scientific discoveries prerequisite to production of a

nuclear chain reaction

was attributable almost exclusively to great European scientists such as
Becquerel, who discovered the phenomenon of radioactivity; de Broglie , the
founder of wave mechanics ; and Einstein, the German who evolved the mass-energy
relationships.

Indeed it was two Germans , Leise Meitner and Otto Hahn who

succeeded in splitting an atom of uranium, thus producing the first nuclear
fission.
It was to this pure research that the Americans--the world's greatest
builders--applied their technological know-how to achieve the first practical
nuclear weapon.
The time has now come for Americans to distribute their energies more
evenly between basic research and the applied science s.

With the forces of

Communism controlling such a major proportion of the world's people , the
interchange of ideas in the field of fundamental research has been greatly
restricted .

We must in the future rely to a much greater extent , on our

own

ingenuity for the discoveries that result from fundamental research to which
we can apply our unsurpassed technological capabilities.
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It would be foolish to expect the fruits of our efforts in the field of
pure re search to be apparent immediately.

Indeed our effort must begin with

the stimulation of the minds of our younger children in the full knowledge
that many years will elapse before their minds are trained and developed to the
stage that they are qualified to independently seek the satisfaction of their
curiosities with respect to the mysteries of the universe.

The short-sighted

approach , however, of concentrating exclusively on immediate defense needs
would surely pre-doom the liberty of our grandchildren.

At the present time

the United States is engaged in the most extensive and concentrated research
effort in our history.

Unfortunately, however 1 only about 10 per cent of our

scientific effort is directed at pure research.

A re-examination of the dis

tribution and size of our effort is certainly in order.

We must no longer

discount programs simply because they do not promise immediate results and
solutions to our current difficulty.
There are those who are of the honest opinion that if we achieve a lead in
missiles and their successor weapons of the future > our defense problems are
solved .

Not only do they picture "massive retaliation" as a deterrent to all-out

war, but also as a deterrent to limited wars , such as that in Korea and Indo
China.

I do not believe that such an opinion is sound.
One of the basic ingredients in any effective deterrent is the enemy's

conviction that our power will be unleashed should he take the action we would
deter.
Now the Connnunists are quite aware that should they commence a nuclear
exchange , every destructive weapon at our command would be unleashed against
Quite frankly; we would have no alternative , and the Communist leaders

them.

know this as well as we do.
But what about a localized aggression against a small country with
satellite troops?

Is the Communist leader convinced that we would commence an

all-out nuclear exchange to prevent it?

I seriously doubt we as a people have

convinced ourselves that we would go so far.

We had nuclear retaliatory

weapons at the time of the Korean War, and at the time of the Indo-Chinese War ,
but we refrained from using them.
conflict.
future?
now?

We decided it the wiser course to limit the

Why should the enemy conclude that we would react differently in the
For that matter , why should we assume that we would react differently

We as a people have no less distaste for a nuclear exchange than we had

earlier.
Our "massive retaliation" power is an effective deterrent to all-out war )

but not to limited wars.

We must have an additional deterrent if we would prevent

them.
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The need for the ability to wage a so-called limited war or a war of less
than all-out proportion has been repeatedly demonstrated.
eyes to the probabilities that they will recur.

We must not close our

The directors of the COimllunist

strategy know full well that the risks involved in an isolated or limited
aggression are far less than in a nuclear exchange.

At the same time we should

have no doubts left that the Communist program, if it is to escape death from
inertia, must attempt continued advancement.

In light of these two factors ,

anyone who denies the probability of more limited wars in the future is out of
touch with reality.
Early reports of the administration's proposed budget for fiscal 1960 lend
some hope that the administration recognizes the need for forces to cope with
wars of a limited nature by proposing no additional cuts in Army strength.

Not

only would it be a fallacy to further reduce our potential in this field, but
it would be the far wiser course to commence immediately a strengthening of
these forces and a stepped-up program of modernization of equipment.

Our

present conventional forces are not sufficient in numbers 1 equipment or transport
to constitute a sufficient deterrent to limited wars.

This weakness must be

recognized and corrected before it is too late.
It is imperative that our armed might be of such strength as to deter the
enemy, if at all possible, not only from precipitating an all-out nuclear
exchange, but also from engaging in any other type of aggression to advance
his ideology; and in the event the potential antagonist forsakes the resort to
reason to which any deterrent is addressed, our defense must be adequate to
bring decisive defeat to the enemy's effort whatever be its scope.
The build-up of armed might must be accomplished with a steadfast knowledge
that we must at the same time conserve our economic strength.

The cause of

Communism could realize victory over liberty just as completely if we suffered
an economic collapse as in the event of our military collapse.

Property and

people are destroyed as effectively through the medium of inflation as they are
with bullets , and the knife of inflation has the advantage of silence and
stealth.

In preparing to combat the Communist menace , therefore, economic

strength must be placed on an equality with military strength.
There is no room at this stage for pessimism despite the bread.th of our
challenge.

We are a young and vigorous nation, rich with potentialities and

resources with which to guard our freedom.

We have the most worthy cause in the

history of mankind for which to fight--LIBERTY.

Make no mistake, liberty must

be fought for to be acquired or retained; for, like a jealous woman , liberty
won't stay where it is taken for granted.
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The people of the United States must demand a defense that is secure;
secure not only from a nuclear exchange, but from any aggression, regardless
of its nature or scope.

The demand must be made with an awareness that the

dollar cost is high, and will probably go higher; and that in order to preserve
economic strength at the same time, services that result from non-defense
government spending will have to be limited and possibly curtailed.
Due to the form of government inaugurated by our forefathers with the
Constitution, the people of the United States have, during the entirety of the
history of our nation, held the power of their liberty and destiny in their
own hands.

Since our ascension to leadership in the struggle of freedom against

Communism, the people of the United States have come to hold the key to the
liberty and destiny of all the peoples of the world.

Let us accept this

awesome responsibility, and discharge it in keeping with the heritage as
champions of liberty that is ours.

END
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